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RECORD LABELS, FEDERAL COURTS, AND 
THE FCC:  USING UNCERTAINTY IN 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW TO FIGHT ONLINE 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Brian Pearl* 
 
Illegal downloading continues to plague the music industry.  Further-
more, the music industry has little to show for its significant investment in 
costly, labor-intensive copyright litigation.  Federal courts have been in-
creasingly unsympathetic to copyright holders, refusing to let substantial 
damages awards in several high-profile cases stand.  In addition, the South-
ern District of New York recently ruled that YouTube should not be held 
liable for widespread copyright infringement on its site in spite of substan-
tial evidence that YouTube had actual knowledge of the infringement.  
Meanwhile there is great uncertainty in the world of communications law.  
After the D.C. Circuit thwarted the Federal Communications Commission’s 
(“FCC”) efforts to stop Comcast from “throttling,” or purposefully slowing, 
peer-to-peer file-sharing traffic on its network, the FCC drafted a new set 
of regulations for broadband providers.  The new regulations have been 
challenged from every angle, and will likely be tied up in litigation for 
years.  These legal developments have coincided with the availability of 
new, legal, online music services such as Spotify and Google Music.  This 
Comment argues that music industry groups such as the Recording Industry 
Association of America should take advantage of the uncertainty in com-
munications law and attempt to shift consumer behavior away from illegal 
downloading and toward legal online music services by engaging in a lob-
bying effort designed to convince Internet service providers to resume 
throttling peer-to-peer file-sharing services. 
 
 
* J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2011; B.A., Manhattan School of Music, 1999.  The author 
would like to thank UCLA School of Law Professors Jerry Kang and Doug Lichtman for their 
advice, guidance and encouragement.  The author would also like to give special thanks to Chief 
Production Editor Jenna Spatz and the rest of the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
Entertainment Law Review for their tireless efforts and help in making this publication possible. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Illegal downloading of copyrighted content continues to plague the 
music industry.1  A recent report commissioned by the British Recorded 
Music Industry estimates that over three-quarters of the music downloaded 
in the United Kingdom is obtained illegally.2  Specifically, the report esti-
mates that 7.7 million British consumers illegally downloaded a staggering 
1.2 billion songs in 2010 alone.3  A 2007 study conducted by the Institute 
for Policy Innovation estimates that global music piracy results in over $12 
billion in economic damages on an annual basis, and a loss of over 70,000 
jobs in the United States alone.4 
Furthermore, it has become painfully clear that costly copyright litiga-
tion has been an ineffective weapon in the war against online piracy, yield-
ing minimal results in several high-profile cases.5  In Sony BMG v. Tenen-
baum, Massachusetts District Court Judge Nancy Gertner held that a jury 
verdict of $675,000 against defendant Joel Tenenbaum for illegally down-
loading and sharing copyrighted songs was unconstitutionally excessive in 
light of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.6  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently reversed Judge 
Gertner’s decision, reinstating the original $675,000 jury verdict.7  How-
ever, the First Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for con-
sideration of common law remittitur, an issue that Judge Gertner declined 
to decide.8  Accordingly, the copyright-holder-plaintiffs will likely face a 
 
1. See, e.g., Press Release, British Recorded Music Indus., New BPI Report Shows Illegal 
Downloading Remains Serious Threat to Britain’s Digital Music Future (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.bpi.co.uk/press-area/news-amp3b-press-release/article/new-bpi-report-shows-illegal-
downloading-remains-serious-threat-to-britains-digital-music-future.aspx. 
2. Geoff Taylor, Digital Music Nation, in DIGITAL MUSIC NATION 2010:  THE UK’S LEGAL 
AND ILLEGAL DIGITAL MUSIC LANDSCAPE 1 (Dec. 2010), available at 
https://bpi.co.uk/assets/files/Digital%20Music%20Nation%202010.pdf. 
3. Illegal Downloading in the UK on the Rise, NME (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.nme.com/news/various-artists/54283. 
4. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF SOUND 
RECORDING PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 14 (Policy Report 188 Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.ipi.org/IPI%5CIPIPublications.nsf/PublicationLookupFullTextPDF/51CC65A1D477
9E408625733E00529174/$File/SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf?OpenElement.  
5. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010); 
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010); Viacom Int’l Inc. 
v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
6. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 121, aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in 
part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
7. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 515 (1st Cir. 2011). 
8. Id. at 491, 515. 
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choice between accepting a reduced award or enduring (and paying for) a 
new trial.9 
Meanwhile, in Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, three separate 
juries found Minnesota resident Jammie Thomas-Rasset liable for copy-
right infringement.  However, District Court Judge Michael Davis refused 
to let the second jury’s award stand, reducing a $1.92 million award to 
$54,000 on remittitur grounds.10  A third jury verdict against Thomas-
Rasset, awarding the plaintiffs $1.5 million in damages, is currently on ap-
peal on constitutional grounds.11  The result in Tenenbaum suggests that 
Thomas-Rasset’s constitutional argument may find a receptive audience in 
federal court. 
Furthermore, in Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Judge 
Louis L. Stanton of the Southern District of New York dealt a potentially 
crushing blow to the copyright-holder plaintiffs.12  Viacom brought suit 
against YouTube, alleging that “tens of thousands of videos on You-
Tube . . . were unlawfully taken from Viacom’s copyrighted works without 
authorization.”13  Viacom argued that YouTube had actual knowledge of 
infringement, and that YouTube was “aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity [was] apparent”—so-called “red flag” infringe-
ment.14  Viacom further argued that YouTube’s awareness of this “red flag” 
infringement precluded YouTube from using the safe harbor of section 
512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as an affirmative defense.15  
Judge Stanton found Viacom’s arguments unpersuasive, summarily dis-
missing them in a cursory opinion that effectively rendered the concept of 
“red flag” infringement a nullity.16 
 
9. Id.; see also Milton J. Valencia, Court Upholds Fine in Music Download Case, 
BOSTON.COM (Sept. 20, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-09-20/news/30180976_1_appeals-
court-joel-tenenbaum-district-court.  
10. Capitol Records Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045. 
11. Record Companies Plan Music Downloading Appeal, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9P9CPV03.htm. 
12. Viacom Int’l Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514. 
13. Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Liab. & Inapplicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbor Def. at 1, Viacom 
Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103).  
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 3–4. 
16. Viacom Int’l Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529; Ben Sheffner, Viacom v. YouTube:  A Disap-
pointing Decision, but How Important?, COPYRIGHTS & CAMPAIGNS (June 27, 2010), 
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2010/06/viacom-v-youtube-disappointing-
decision.html.  
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Given this disheartening legal landscape, what is the best strategy for 
the music industry to employ in its perpetual fight against online piracy?  
Recent developments in communications law may provide an answer.  In 
August 2008, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) issued an 
order declaring that Comcast’s practice of throttling, or purposefully slow-
ing or blocking peer-to-peer traffic, was impermissible.17  Comcast filed 
suit, and in January 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit declared that the FCC had failed to justify its ex-
ercise of ancillary jurisdiction under the Telecommunications Act when it 
sought to throttle traffic on BitTorrent, a popular peer-to-peer client.18  
Subsequently, the FCC adopted a report and order titled “In the Matter of 
Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices” on December 
21, 2010, which set forth three rules for broadband providers:  (1) Trans-
parency (requiring disclosure of network management practices); (2) No 
blocking (prohibiting blocking of lawful content); and (3) No unreasonable 
discrimination (prohibiting unreasonable discrimination in the transmission 
of lawful Internet traffic).19 
 
17. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation 
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13052 (2008) [hereinafter 
Formal Complaint].  
18. Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (indicating that Comcast 
was specifically throttling traffic on BitTorrent, a popular peer-to-peer client).  The Telecommu-
nications Act was created with the express purpose of “regulating interstate and foreign com-
merce in communication by wire and radio.”  47 U.S.C. § 151 (2011).  However, the FCC has no 
express statutory authority to regulate the Internet.  Accordingly, the FCC attempted to justify its 
order declaring Comcast’s practice of throttling impermissible by relying on its ancillary jurisdic-
tion, under which the FCC may issue regulations “reasonably ancillary” to an exercise of statuto-
rily granted authority.  See, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
19. The FCC explained the three rules as follows: 
i.  Transparency:  Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose the network 
management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of 
their broadband services;  
ii.  No blocking:  Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applica-
tions, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block 
lawful websites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video te-
lephony services; and  
iii.  No unreasonable discrimination:  Fixed broadband providers may not unrea-
sonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic. 
Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906 (2010); 
see also Net Neutrality Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/126280?redirectedFrom=net%20neutrality#eid236427655 (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2012) (“[T]he fact or principle of Internet service providers enabling access to all 
content and applications regardless of the source or destination, and without favouring [sic] or 
blocking particular formats, products, web sites, etc.”). 
 
2012] RECORD LABELS, FEDERAL COURTS, AND THE FCC 63 
 
The new FCC regulations have been criticized from various angles.20  
On the one hand, net neutrality proponents claim that the proposed 
regulations fall far short of President Obama’s campaign promise to 
achieve true net neutrality.21  On the other hand, Republicans, who gener-
ally oppose government intervention, have vowed to challenge the new 
FCC regulations during the next Congressional term.22  In addition, linger-
ing doubts about whether the FCC has statutory authority to regulate the 
Internet under Title I of the Telecommunications Act make future litigation 
over the new regulations virtually inevitable.23  The only thing that can be 
said with any certainty is that, until all of the various challenges to the new 
FCC regulations are resolved, it appears impossible to know what the ac-
tual operative regulations are.24  Accordingly, this article will argue that 
music industry groups such as the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”) should attempt to shift consumer behavior toward legal 
music services not by appealing to morality, ethics, or the law, but by using 
technology to make illegal downloading cumbersome and inconvenient.  
Specifically, this Comment will argue that the RIAA should engage in a 
lobbying effort to convince Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to throttle 
peer-to-peer services such as BitTorrent, where a significant percentage of 
illegal downloading occurs. 
Part II of the article discusses several recent high profile copyright 
cases and their adverse results.  Part III of the article then discusses the cur-
rent uncertainty in communication law regarding the FCC’s ability to regu-
late peer-to-peer Internet traffic.  Part III of the article additionally suggests 
that the RIAA engage in the aforementioned lobbying effort in order to in-
directly steer consumers toward new services that provide legal options for 
downloading and streaming music. 
 
20. Compare Troy Wolverton, New ‘Net Neutrality’ Rules Don’t Go Far Enough, 
TRIBLIVE (Jan. 2, 2011),  http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/focus/s_716201.html#, 
with Brian Stelter, F.C.C. Faces Challenges to Net Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at B1. 
21. See Wolverton, supra note 20; see also Roy Mark, Obama Promises Net Neutrality, 
EWEEK (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-Wireless/Obama-Promises-Net-
Neutrality (reporting that during the 2008 presidential campaign, then-candidate Barack Obama 
promised to appoint pro-net neutrality FCC commissioners if elected in order to ensure a “level 
playing field” on the Internet, such that the “speed with which and quality of” a user’s downloads 
or links remained consistent regardless of the particular website a user chose to visit). 
22. Stelter, supra note 20.  
23. See id.; Can the FCC Regulate the Internet?:  Transcript, ON THE MEDIA (Dec. 24, 2010), 
http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/12/24/02 (transcribing an interview with FCC Commis-
sioner Michael Copps about FCC’s authority under Title I of the Telecommunications Act). 
24. Compare Stelter, supra note 20, with Can the FCC Regulate the Internet?:  Transcript, 
supra note 23. 
 
64 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:59 
 
II.  THE PROBLEM:  FEDERAL COURTS, COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, AND 
THE INTERNET 
A.  Statutory Damages Cases 
The Recording Industry Association of America officially abandoned 
the practice of directly suing consumers for illegal file-sharing in 2008.25  
However, two of the most widely known file-sharing lawsuits, Capitol Re-
cords Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, and Sony BMG v. Tenenbaum, are still pend-
ing resolution.26  In both cases, juries found the defendants liable for copy-
right infringement, awarding damages under the statutory damages 
provision of the Copyright Act.27  However, judges in both cases have re-
fused to allow damage awards that were within the statutorily mandated 
range.28  Thus, the victories in these two cases have been somewhat hollow.  
While juries found defendants liable and were willing to award significant 
damages to the record label-plaintiffs, judges slashed these awards by as 
much as ninety-seven percent, suggesting implicit hostility towards plain-
tiffs in cases involving online copyright infringement.29 
In Sony BMG v. Tenenbaum, several major record labels sued Joel 
Tenenbaum based on his use of the peer-to-peer file sharing application cli-
ent Kazaa to illegally download and share thirty copyrighted songs.30  A 
Massachusetts jury found Tenenbaum liable for copyright infringement, 
awarding the plaintiffs $675,000 in statutory damages, or $22,500 per 
song.31  Though the damages award was well within the statutory range, 
Tenenbaum filed a motion challenging the size of the award on both com-
mon law and constitutional grounds.32  The plaintiffs made it clear that they 
 
25. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html. 
26. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (MJD/LIB), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 85662 (D. Minn. July 22, 2011); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 
(1st Cir. 2011).   
27. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1061 (D. Minn. 2010); 
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 121 (D. Mass. 2010) aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011).  
28. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 121; Capitol Records Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1061. 
29. Nate Anderson, Judge Slashes “Monstrous” P2P Award by 97% to $54,000, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 22, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/01/judge-
slashes-monstrous-jammie-thomas-p2p-award-by-35x.ars. 
30. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 87–88. 
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would likely not accept a reduced award based on remittitur.33  Accordingly, 
Judge Gertner dedicated most of her sixty-four page opinion to Tenen-
baum’s constitutional challenge.34  After a lengthy analysis of punitive dam-
ages jurisprudence, Judge Gertner reached the questionable conclusion that 
the “guideposts” articulated by the Supreme Court in the seminal punitive 
damages case BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore35 could be properly ap-
plied to a statutory damages award under the Copyright Act.36 
Judge Gertner held that the jury’s award of $675,000 “cannot stand 
because it is ‘so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to 
the offense and obviously unreasonable.’”37  Judge Gertner then decided, 
somewhat arbitrarily, that $2,250 per song “is the outer limit of what a jury 
could reasonably (and constitutionally) impose in this case.”38  Not surpris-
ingly, the record labels have filed an appellate brief, arguing that Judge 
Gertner’s analysis and conclusions are “hopelessly flawed,” manifesting 
“hostility” toward the record labels based on the court’s opinion that defen-
dants like Tenenbaum were “comparatively venial offenders.”39 
The First Circuit recently reversed and remanded the case, reinstating 
the $675,000 damages award against Tenenbaum.40  However, the court re-
jected all of Tenenbaum’s substantive arguments, instead reversing Judge 
Gertner on the narrow basis that the court “declined to adhere to the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance on the ground that it felt resolution of a 
constitutional due process question was inevitable in the case before it.”41  
Accordingly, though the First Circuit reinstated the $675,000 damages 
award, it also remanded the case back to the district court with instructions 
to consider reducing the award on common law remittitur grounds (as op-
posed to Constitutional Due Process grounds).42  In the likely event the dis-
 
33. Id. at 88. 
34. Id. 
35. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding punitive damages in a suit 
regarding undisclosed repairs to a vehicle would be excessive and thus violate due process, unless 
the defendant’s conduct gave notice of such penalty, as measured by three “guideposts”). 
36. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 103. 
37. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).  
38. Id. at 117. 
39. Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ Opening Brief at 24 n.5, Sony BMG Music 
Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010) (Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052) 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
40. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 660 F.3d 487. 
41. Id. at 508. 
42. Id. at 515. 
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trict court does reduce the damages award, the plaintiffs will face the unde-
sirable choice between a reduced damages award and a costly new trial.43 
In Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, several major record labels sued 
Jammie Thomas-Rasset, a Minnesota resident,44 who, like Joel Tenenbaum, 
engaged in illegal file-sharing using the computer software Kazaa.45  A jury 
eventually found Thomas-Rasset liable for copyright infringement of 
twenty-four songs, awarding the plaintiffs $222,000, or $9,250 per song, in 
statutory damages.46  Judge Michael Davis ordered a new trial sua sponte 
on the basis of a faulty jury instruction on the meaning of “distribution” 
under the Copyright Act.47  Notably, Judge Davis dedicated the last section 
of the opinion to the size of the jury’s $222,000 damages award,48 an issue 
wholly irrelevant to granting a new trial.  Judge Davis implored Congress 
to amend the Copyright Act and criticized the jury’s $222,000 award, call-
ing it “unprecedented and oppressive.”49 
On June 18, 2009, a second jury found Thomas-Rasset liable, this 
time awarding statutory damages in the amount of $80,000 per song, or 
$1.92 million in total.50  Judge Davis noted that the record label-plaintiffs 
had “highlight[ed] valid reasons that Thomas-Rasset must pay a statutory 
damages award.”51  However, Judge Davis ultimately concluded that, de-
spite plaintiffs’ arguments “and the [c]ourt’s deference to the jury’s verdict, 
$2 million for stealing 24 songs for personal use is simply shocking.”52  
Judge Davis ultimately concluded that the damages should be reduced from 
 
43. Id.  It is worth noting that during the damages phase of the district court trial, the Re-
cording Industry Association of America made clear that it would not agree to any reduced figure.  
Valencia, supra note 9.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that a new trial will take place 
should the district court decide to reduce the damages award on remand from the First Circuit.  
44. Ben Sheffner, Third Thomas-Rasset Verdict:  $1.5 million, COPYRIGHTS & CAMPAIGNS 
(Nov. 3, 2010), http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2010/11/third-thomas-rasset-
verdict-15-million.html. 
45. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13 (D. Minn. 2008).  
46. Id. at 1227. 
47. Id. at 1226–27. 
48. Id. at 1227–28. 
49. Id.  
50. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D. Minn. 2010); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (setting maximum statutory damages at $150,000 on the 
condition that the copyright owner is able to prove the infringement was committed willfully).   
51. Capitol Records Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 
52. Id. at 1054. 
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$1.92 million to a relatively paltry $54,000, or $2,250 per song—only three 
times the statutory damages minimum of $750 per infringement.53 
On November 3, 2010, a third jury found Thomas-Rasset liable for 
copyright infringement, this time awarding $1.5 million, or $62,500 per 
song infringement, in statutory damages.54  Thomas-Rasset has since chal-
lenged this judgment on constitutional grounds, asking for either a com-
plete removal of the statutory damages award or a reduction of the damages 
“to an amount that this [c]ourt believes is constitutional.”55 
Judge Davis reduced the second damages award on common law re-
mittitur grounds.56  However, given his reaction to damages awards of 
$222,000 and $1.92 million,57 it is reasonable to conclude that he will 
likely follow Judge Gertner’s lead in the Tennenbaum decision, and reduce 
the $1.5 million award on constitutional grounds. 
The Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset cases clearly illustrate the con-
siderable difficulties that record labels face in federal courts.  In Sony 
BMG v. Tenenbaum, Judge Gertner purportedly gave appropriate defer-
ence “‘to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for’ 
copyright infringement” and the jury’s judgment before slashing the 
jury’s damages award by eigthy-nine percent.58  As noted above, while 
the First Circuit reversed Judge Gertner’s decision,59 it is likely that the 
plaintiffs will have to accept a reduced award or undergo a new trial.  In 
addition, Judge Davis mentioned that he gave “deference to the jury’s 
verdict” before reducing the jury’s damages award of $1.92 million by 
ninety-seven percent.60  It is difficult to reconcile claims of deference 
with such drastic action from the bench. 
 
53. Id. at 1056–57; 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . an award 
of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one 
work . . . in a sum of not less than $750 . . . .”). 
54. Sheffner, supra note 44. 
55. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter 
of Law at 2, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (No. 
06-cv-1497-MJD). 
56. Capitol Records Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1056–57. 
57. Capitol Records Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227–28 (“Her status as a consumer who is not 
seeking to harm her competitors or make a profit does not excuse her behavior.  But it does make 
the award of hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages unprecedented and oppressive.”); Capi-
tol Records Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (“[D]espite the combination of these justifications and 
the Court’s deference to the jury’s verdict, $2 million for stealing 24 songs for personal use is 
simply shocking.”). 
58. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 89, 12 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 
U.S. at 583). 
59. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 660 F.3d 487. 
60. Capitol Records Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1054, 1057. 
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B.  Safe Harbor Under Section 512(c) of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Another recent high-profile copyright case, Viacom International Inc. 
v. YouTube, Inc.,61 could make litigating against websites that turn a blind 
eye to rampant copyright infringement even more difficult.  In this case, 
Viacom sued YouTube in a New York federal district court, seeking $1 bil-
lion in damages based on allegations that “tens of thousands of videos on 
YouTube, resulting in hundreds of millions of views, were taken unlaw-
fully from Viacom’s copyrighted works without authorization.”62  Viacom 
argued that YouTube was both directly and vicariously liable for blatant 
copyright infringement.63  Viacom further argued that YouTube did not 
qualify for the safe harbors of section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.64 
Under section 512(c), a hosting website must remove infringing mate-
rial in order to qualify for safe harbor from suit for copyright infringe-
ment.65  This obligation is triggered if the host:  (1) has actual knowledge 
of the infringement, or (2) is “aware of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent.”66  Judge Stanton relied heavily on legisla-
tive history in holding that YouTube did not have the requisite awareness 
of ongoing infringing activity to negate the application of section 512(c) of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.67  Specifically, Judge Stanton 
claimed that “[m]ere knowledge of prevalence of such [infringing] activity 
in general is not enough.”68 
Judge Stanton’s conclusion is troubling for several reasons.  First, as 
one commentator noted, it is almost impossible to know under his opinion 
“what would actually constitute such ‘red flag’ knowledge.”69  Second, 
 
61. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see Edward 
Berridge, Google Kicks Viacom in the Nadgers, INQUIRER (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1687574/google-kicks-viacom-nadgers.  
62. Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Liability and Inapplicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbor Defense at 1, 
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103).  
63. Id. at 38–46. 
64. Id. at 47–66. 
65. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006). 
66. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(1)–(2). 
67. Viacom Int’l Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523–24.  
68. Id. at 523. 
69. Sheffner, supra note 16 (“The statute (and legislative history) clearly indicate that some 
form of knowledge beyond that imparted via DMCA notices qualifies as knowledge of ‘facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,’ thus triggering a site’s takedown 
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Judge Stanton’s opinion does little to explain why the mountain of evidence 
Viacom presented did not constitute “facts or circumstances from which in-
fringing activity [was] apparent.”70  Viacom appealed Judge Stanton’s deci-
sion.71  However, much like the results in the Tenenbaum and Thomas-
Rasset cases, Judge Stanton’s decision in Viacom suggests that copyright-
holder plaintiffs like Viacom and major record labels cannot look to the 
courts for sympathy in cases involving online copyright infringement. 
III.  THE SOLUTION:  TAKING ADVANTAGE OF  
THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTY IN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
Given the above-referenced judicial skepticism,72 the music industry 
will need to take a creative approach and implement alternative strategies 
in lieu of or in addition to litigation in order to continue its war against on-
line piracy.  Uncertainty in communications law may help provide one such 
strategy. 
Net neutrality has been on the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s (“FCC”) agenda since at least February 2004, when former Chair-
man Michael Powell gave a speech outlining what came to be known as the 
“Four Open Internet Principles.”73  According to a policy statement 
adopted by the FCC on August 5, 2005, consumers are entitled:  (1) “to ac-
cess the lawful Internet content of their choice;” (2) “to run applications 
 
obligation (on pain of losing the safe harbor). But after reading Judge Stanton’s opinion several 
times, I simply have no idea what would actually constitute such ‘red flag’ knowledge.”). 
70.  Id. (noting “[b]oth parties amassed, and cited, thousands of pieces of evidence” that the 
Court “barely mentioned . . . at all”).  In its Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of its Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment, Viacom detailed a multitude of evidence demonstrating that 
YouTube had specific knowledge of infringement of Viacom works on YouTube’s system, in-
cluding:  (1) acknowledgment of the popularity of clips of the television show South Park on 
YouTube; (2) e-mails from users regarding the unauthorized posting of clips of the television 
show Chappelle’s Show on YouTube; and (3) an internal YouTube memo acknowledging that 
many clips of “well-known shows” including Family Guy, South Park, The Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart, and Chappelle’s Show could be found on the site.  Viacom’s Statement of Undisputed 
Facts in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability and Inapplicability of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbor Defense ¶¶ 32, 59, 110, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103); see also Naomi Jane 
Gray, Where’s the Beef?  YouTube Opinion Lacks Heft, SHADES OF GRAY (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.shadesofgraylaw.com/2010/06/30/wheres-the-beefyoutube-opinion-lacks-heft.  
71. John Letzing, Viacom Files Appeal in Google-YouTube Case, MARKETWATCH.COM 
(Dec. 4, 2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/viacom-files-appeal-in-youtube-
litigation-2010-12-03. 
72. See supra Part II. 
73. Stacey Higginbotham, A Net Neutrality Timeline:  How We Got Here, GIGAOM (Dec. 
21, 2010), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/21/a-net-neutrality-timeline-how-we-got-here/ (referring to 
a timeline detailing the evolution of the FCC’s net neutrality policy). 
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and use services of their choice;” (3) “to connect their choice of legal de-
vices that do not harm the network;” and (4) “to competition among net-
work providers, application and service providers . . .  [as well as] content 
providers.”74  These four principles “are subject to reasonable network 
management.”75 
On August 1, 2008, the FCC adopted a Memorandum Opinion and 
Order in response to complaints that Comcast was throttling peer-to-peer 
applications.76  The FCC found that Comcast’s practices “impede[d] Inter-
net content and applications,” and that such practices did not constitute rea-
sonable network management, in violation of the 2008 Policy Statement.77  
Comcast responded with a lawsuit challenging the FCC’s authority to regu-
late the Internet.78  On April 6, 2010, Judge David S. Tatel of the District of 
Columbia Circuit issued an opinion holding that none of the eleven provi-
sions of the Telecommunications Act cited by the FCC actually gave the 
agency the authority required to make and enforce these regulations.79 
One month later, on May 6, 2010, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski 
announced a plan to reclassify the “transmission component of broadband 
access service—and only this component—as a telecommunications serv-
ice,” under Title II of the Telecommunications Act.80  However, the FCC 
abandoned this approach, instead adopting a report and order on December 
21, 2010, by a 3-2 party-line vote, that asserts authority not through reclas-
sification of broadband Internet, but through claims of ancillary jurisdiction 
reminiscent of the reasoning rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit in 
the Comcast decision.81 
Substantively, the regulations are governed by three main principles:  
(1) transparency in network management practices; (2) no blocking of law-
ful content; and (3) no unreasonable discrimination in transmitting lawful 
network traffic.82  These three principles are all subject to the “complemen-
 
74. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 
20 FCC Rcd. 14986, 14988 (2005).  
75. Id. at 14988 n.15. 
76. Formal Complaint, supra note 17. 
77. Id. at 13052–53. 
78. See generally Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
79. Id. at 644. 
80. FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, The Third Way:  A Narrowly Tailored Broadband 
Framework (May 6, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
297944A1.pdf. 
81. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010).  
82. Id. at 17936–56.  
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tary principle of reasonable network management.”83  However, the 
regulations are riddled with exceptions.84  For example, the unreasonable 
discrimination rule does not apply to mobile broadband providers.85  Fur-
thermore, it is unclear from the regulations exactly what constitutes lawful 
or unlawful content.86  In addition, the reasonability of network manage-
ment practices will be determined “on a case-by-case basis, as complaints 
about broadband providers’ actual practices arise.”87 
The FCC regulations have been attacked from all corners.88  Net neu-
trality advocates such as Senator Al Franken have criticized them as “in-
adequate.”89  While Democratic FCC Commissioner Michael Copps reluc-
tantly voted in favor of the new regulations, he believes that the FCC 
“could—and should—have gone further.”90  Critics on the right, including 
dissenting FCC Commissioners Robert M. McDowell and Meredith Baker, 
“vocally opposed the [regulations] as unnecessary and unjustified.”91  
Vows from Congressional Republicans to “push back” and the inevitability 
of future litigation make it difficult to know with any certainty which regu-
lations, if any, will survive.92 
Accordingly, the Recording Industry Association of America  
(“RIAA”) should take advantage of this uncertainty and engage in a lobby-
 
83. Id. at 17906.  
84. See, e.g., id.  
85. See id. at 17962. 
86. See, e.g., id. 
87. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 
17952 (2010).  
88. See Hiawatha Bray, FCC OK’s Internet Service Rules; Net Neutrality Backers, Foes Not 
Happy with Results, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2010, at 7; see also Stelter, supra note 20 (identifying 
parties with conflicting views on the FCC regulations).   
89. Press Release, Al Franken, U.S. Senator from Minn., (Dec. 21, 2010), 
http://franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1246; see also Wolverton, supra note 20. 
90. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 18046 
(2010) (concurring statement of FCC Commissioner Michael Copps).  
91. Stelter, supra note 20; see also Robert M. McDowell, The FCC’s Threat to Internet 
Freedom, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2010, at A23; Peter Ferrara, Net Neutrality Is Theft, AM. 
SPECTATOR (Dec. 29, 2010), http://spectator.org/archives/2010 /12/29/net-neutrality-is-theft 
(“[W]ithout compelling reason, law or even politics on their side, on December 21, on a 3-2 party 
line vote, the FCC voted to impose its ‘net neutrality’ rules on the Internet.”); Jonathan Gurwitz, 
Net Neutrality is Anything but Neutral, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Dec. 25, 2010), 
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/ columnists/jonathan_gurwitz/article/Net-neutrality-is-
anything-but-neutral-917994.php.  
92. Can the FCC Regulate the Internet?:  Transcript, supra note 23 (quoting Copps:  
“You’re going to go to court no matter what you do around here.  I’ve been at this place for ten 
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ing effort designed to convince Internet service providers (“ISPs”) nation-
wide to engage in exactly the sort of throttling of peer-to-peer traffic that 
resulted in the Comcast decision.93  By slowing peer-to-peer traffic, the 
ISPs, in cooperation with the RIAA, could help indirectly shift consumers 
toward legal music services.  As Google researchers have found, “‘speed 
matters’ on the Internet.”94  For example, slowing down the Google search 
results page by less than half of a second resulted in 0.2% to 0.6% fewer 
searches.95  Furthermore, the longer users were exposed to delayed search 
results, the fewer searches they performed.96  While use of the Google 
search engine and illegal file-sharing are hardly exact parallels, it is reason-
able to assume that the general principle that speed affects conduct on the 
Internet is applicable to file sharing. 
Consequently, significantly slowing down peer-to-peer traffic could 
have a tangible impact on online piracy.  This is especially true given the 
ongoing developments in the online music market.97  While Apple’s iTunes 
Music Store is still the dominant online music retailer, Amazon.com has 
emerged as a competitor, “aggressively discounting whole albums,” often 
selling albums by major artists for as little as $3.99.98  In addition, other ma-
jor online marketing developments have recently launched.  More specifi-
cally, Google Music, a cloud-based service allowing users to purchase new 
music and store their preexisting collections online, launched on May 10, 
2011.99  Spotify, a cloud-based service wildly popular in Europe, was finally 
launched in the United States on July 14, 2011.100  Additionally, Apple re-
 
93. See Formal Complaint, supra note 17 (noting Comcast’s practice of “selectively tar-
get[ing] and interfer[ing] with connections of peer-to-peer (P2P) applications” without disclosing 
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94. Jake Brutlag, Speed Matters, GOOGLE RES. BLOG (June 23, 2009), 
http://googleresearch.blogspot.com/2009/06/speed-matters.html; see also About Andrew B. King, 
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visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
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96. Id. 
97. See, e.g., Hello America.  Spotify Here., SPOTIFY (July 14, 2011), 
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2010, at B1. 
99. See Google Set to Launch “Music Beta” Service Today (May 10), NME (May 10, 2011), 
http://www.nme.com/news/various-artists/56567; see also Introducing Google Play, GOOGLE 
PLAY, https://play.google.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) . 
100. See Hello America.  Spotify Here., supra note 97. 
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leased its own cloud-based service on November 14, 2011.101  Overall, con-
sumers are likely to have an ever-expanding array of choices when it comes 
to legally obtaining music online.102  If peer-to-peer traffic can be slowed 
significantly, it is all the more likely that some consumers who currently 
choose to engage in illegal file-sharing will instead explore legal alterna-
tives.  As noted above, an estimated 7.7 million British consumers were re-
sponsible for 1.2 billion illegal downloads in 2010 alone.103  The number of 
illegal downloads in the United States is much higher.104  While it may be 
impossible to stop all online piracy, this proposed lobbying effort would be 
worthwhile if even a small percentage of the millions of consumers illegally 
sharing billions of songs could be rerouted to legal options. 
Of course, throttling peer-to-peer traffic could lead to another chal-
lenge brought by the FCC.  However, an FCC challenge would take a sig-
nificant amount of time to mount, especially given the challenges that FCC 
regulations are likely to face in the coming year.105  Furthermore, even if 
the new regulations generally survive congressional and judicial scrutiny, 
there would be a myriad of issues to be litigated on a case-by-case basis.  
Some of these issues, such as what constitutes unlawful content and 
whether a particular network management practice is reasonable, may be 
well worth litigating.  Even if it is ultimately determined that throttling 
peer-to-peer traffic is, in fact, impermissible, much ground would need to 
be gained in the significant period of time that would elapse before such a 
determination becomes final.106  This process would play itself out over 
months and years.107  Accordingly, the RIAA should act immediately in or-
der to gain as much traction as possible in the war against online piracy. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Costly, time-consuming copyright litigation is simply no longer a vi-
able strategy for the music industry.108  Furthermore, there is significant 
uncertainty regarding what FCC-issued regulations regarding net neutrality, 
if any, the agency will be able to enforce.109  Accordingly, the Recording 
Industry Association of America and major record labels would be wise to 
focus their efforts on lobbying ISPs to throttle peer-to-peer traffic.  Doing 
so is a means of redirecting consumers who might otherwise engage in on-
line copyright infringement to legal online music services that have re-
cently materialized.110  While it is impossible to completely eliminate on-
line piracy in its entirety, such an effort could have a significant and 
positive impact on an entertainment industry devastated by its emergence. 
 
 
108. See supra Part II.A. 
109. See supra Part III. 
110. See id. 
